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Chapter  
 
Pervasive incentives, disparate innovation and intellectual property law 
 
William Van Caenegem 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Current interest in patent policy reaches beyond the academic community, as two 
recent newspaper articles demonstrate: one concerned how ‘a new technique for 
creating embryo-free human stem cells sidesteps a controversial US patent that has 
slowed the pace of scientific discovery worldwide ….’1 James Thomson of the 
University of Wisconsin generated the patent but also the breakthrough which 
circumvents it. Since another group simultaneously reported the technique no ‘one 
team can control it’, according to the author. The other article related to the Australian 
National University (ANU), which was told by the Australian Universities Quality 
Audit (AUQA) to ‘better promote the intellectual property attached to its research to 
raise its profile’.2 AUQA stressed that even if the ANU was not set to make much 
money from exploiting IP, at least exploitation ‘could raise ANU’s standing in the 
global community’.3  
 
The first story illustrates that diverse and unpredictable events affect the value of 
patents. Patenting has created a dense web of rights within which interactions and 
exchanges occur in a highly complex and contingent manner. Single invention, single 
patent, single product linear innovation is not the norm. The second story has a now 
familiar ring to it: patents can play a significant (but unintentional) role in enhancing 
the value of goodwill or reputation attached to an innovator’s brand. Below the 
surface, however, lies a meta-tale about patent policy’s constant adaptation and 
mutation in response to theoretical critiques or uncomfortable empirical data: that 
patents do not actually induce innovation does not matter so much, since they have 
the benefit of strengthening your reputation. 
 
The ‘mutation’ literature and the rising tide of condemnatory critiques of the patents 
system,4 invite us to revisit the complex relationship between intellectual property law 
and creativity within a contemporary industrial and commercial context. Creativity 
flourishes not simply because of incentives provided by intellectual property rights 
(IPRs), or specifically by patents in the industrial context; rather, all IPR’s interact 
dynamically with multiple other factors to influence the nature, locality, direction and 
volume of creative output – whether in the arts or industry. The other factors that 
engender creativity, or, focussing on industry, that act as incentives to invent are so 
multifarious and complex in their interaction that they are difficult to map.5 
Nonetheless, we should not shrink from contextual accounts of the role of IPRs; in 
that light I revisit the account of patents as incentives within a contemporary socio-
economic context below. 
 
Attention is first drawn to the perceived core role of patents as an incentive for firms 
to invent. Then the focus shifts to incentives for individuals to invent, or more 
particularly to generate, divulge and realise inventive ideas. In relation to the former I 
suggest that it is arguable that in the light of the pervasiveness of incentives to invent 
in contemporary industry and society the need for patents as incentives must be 
exposed to serious debate. At best patents could amount to little more than an 
additional and superfluous incentive. It may be that the account of patents as 
incentives to invent is so uncertain, that a perception of patents as measures to 
enhance competition in particular circumstances should be preferred.  
 
In relation to individuals I argue that because incentives pervade society, innovation is 
disparate, that is, it happens simultaneously and heterogeneously in multiple 
organisations. This generates the need for legal instruments that underpin 
coordination of innovation, and also for legal settings that enhance the transfer of 
knowledge and information between organisations. Perhaps the most significant 
mechanism by which the latter occurs is through the mobility of knowledgeable 
individuals between organisations. In terms of the law, this means that employees 
should not be subject to unwarranted restraints, whether contractual or equitable, on 
their ability to draw on all they have learned from previous employment (in the same 
way that they can draw freely on anything learned during formal courses of 
instruction). Furthermore, in making their choices as to where their know-how and 
creative abilities will be most productively used they must be as free as possible from 
legal restraints on their use of knowledge. This freedom will have beneficial effects in 
terms of innovation performance. 
 
 
II. Pervasive incentives for innovation in firms and the need for patents  
 
A. Patents as incentives to invent 
 Patents are said to constitute a critical incentive to invent. However, clearly a patent 
per se cannot operate as an incentive – a patent imposes costs. In fact the incentive is 
the potential return from monopolistic exploitation. But this return is very uncertain at 
the time of patenting, and many patents are never turned to account, so that the cost is 
never offset by monopoly gains. If one is turned to account, it is not clear to what 
extent profits are increased by the patent – in other words, would equivalent returns 
on an innovation have been generated in the absence of the patent? Further it is not 
clear at what level the incentive is supposed to operate – at the individual or the firm 
level? At the very least, considerable uncertainty surrounds the incentive account. 
Below I make an attempt to address it by rephrasing the incentive question: rather 
than ask ‘Does a patent work as an incentive to invent?’, I ask ‘Is there a shortage of 
incentives to invent which requires an additional incentive in the form of a technology 
monopoly?’. This is not a question to which I attempt to give a definitive answer; 
rather I point out that it is arguable both at the socio-cultural level, and at the 
industrial or economic level, that incentives to invent already pervade society in the 
absence of patents. This affects the account that posits that firms require an additional 
regulatory incentive to invent. 
 
Although there is no underlying consensus about the inducement effects of patents or 
about the need for patents as an incentive across industry, they are certainly perceived 
by both participants and commentators to be crucial in particular sectors, pharma 
being the outstanding example. But we have to be cautious in interpreting that fact as 
supporting the incentive theory of patents. The pharmaceutical products sector has 
certain very particular characteristics: the marketed product and the patented 
invention tend to be coextensive;6 the risk and sunk cost of investment in adopted 
research pathways is high, with great potential for total losses;7 alternative strategies 
to appropriate the advantages from innovation are largely inoperable; the potential 
lifespan of the product is relatively long; the cost of imitation and reverse-engineering 
is low; the required skills in manufacturing are generic and readily available; there is 
little room for product improvements and enhancements; and potential imitators tend 
to be highly informed and highly skilled. Substitution by new technologies (new 
drugs) is potentially the most significant source of competition in the sector, yet it is 
stymied by these characteristics, which may be further aggravated by particular 
conditions in any given geographical market. Products in other sectors may be 
different in any number of crucial respects: the patent and the product not coextensive; 
the time to market shorter; risks and expense of R&D smaller; potential for continual 
improvements greater; natural barriers to imitation higher (imitation lag is greater); 
secrecy more useable; other (legal) appropriation strategies available and the like. 
Think software for instance, where the need for patents is greatly contested.  
 
So, rather than demonstrating a lack of incentive to invent new drugs, the perceived 
sectoral importance of patents points to the peculiar characteristics of that product 
sector: they militate against dynamic competition by introduction of new technologies. 
There is good ground for arguing there is a competition problem, which could be 
efficiently addressed by a technology monopoly, but it is not at all clear that there is 
an incentive problem. To expand this beyond the pharmaceuticals sector, the problem 
a technology monopoly might usefully address is a failure of competition in particular 
product sectors, rather than a lack of incentives to invent in industry.  
 
B. Pervasive incentives to invent 
 
In reality incentives to invent pervade post-industrial society. The healthcare sector is 
a paradigmatic example of this: nowhere is the incentive to generate new solutions 
stronger. This pervasiveness is apparent both at the individual and socio-cultural level, 
and at the level of industry and the economy. Furthermore, the significance of the 
former cannot be ignored at the level of the latter: social and cultural factors that 
compel people to invent also impact at the level of the economy. They cannot be 
ignored in favour of an exclusively ‘financial’ analysis at the firm level. 
 
In industrialised nations such as those in North America, Europe and Australasia, a 
high premium is attached to individual creativity and originality. Conversely, copying, 
imitation and ‘following’ are ascribed less value.8 The culture of individualism 
engendering personal originality and creativity is very strong. In other words, in a 
technological setting, there is a strong cultural incentive to search for new and 
creative practical answers to problems, rather than to meet them with fatalistic 
acceptance or an exclusively spiritual response. This applies to even the most 
intractable issues facing society, whether they be more social (for example, sexism in 
society) or environmental (for instance, global warming or disease). 
 
There is also a strong socio-cultural innovation pull resulting from public perceptions 
about science: it is perceived as a potential source of new solutions to most problems. 
In other words, people inherently expect that solutions to problems will emerge from 
new and creative applications of scientific knowledge; science is not exclusively 
valued for its own sake. The public automatically assumes that creative individuals 
are somewhere engaged in plumbing the depths of science to find new solutions to 
problems. 
 
At the more institutional level of education and research, creativity, inventiveness and 
originality are also core values. Solid peer-review based incentive mechanisms 
underpin and institutionalise the search for new and original ideas and insights. Prize 
and other evaluation systems focus on creativity, novelty and originality, as does 
assessment for publication. The whole tendency of science and humanities research 
and teaching is towards the new, original and different. Scientific research is dynamic, 
with an exponential growth in new knowledge in decentralised and multifarious 
institutions. None of this new knowledge would come about without deep and 
pervasive personal and institutional incentives. These incentives also compel 
individuals to seek out and immerse themselves in new environments that will 
enhance their own creative output and inventiveness. Labour market policy tends to 
prioritise mobility, so that the expectation that knowledgeable individuals will seek 
out the most fertile environment for creative work can be fulfilled. 
 
Another factor encouraging innovation is both socio-cultural and market based: 
consumer focus on novelty.9 The latest is the best, and much advertising, product 
development and market strategising is centred on and accelerates the cultural desire 
for the new and different. There is a constant demand for new versions and 
enhancements, improvements, changes in design and so on. At the same time society 
is very techno-focussed: technology pervades lives and technology always changes 
and, either in reality or in perception improves our lives over time. This view may not 
be universally accepted, but it is sufficiently pervasive to be a significant force in 
society. 
 
Economically or industrially also incentives for firms to innovate are pervasive. The 
conditions that now sustain the drive to innovate in industry are completely different 
from what prevailed during the industrial age. Then information channels were few, 
they operated slowly and were not universally accessible. Education levels were poor. 
The industrial infrastructure was heavy, solid and difficult to replace, lead times for 
innovation in plant and machinery were long, and specialisation in machine 
manufacture was not as advanced as it is now. The risks inherent in innovation in 
industry, with potential downtime and so forth were very high. Anti-competitive 
conduct was not actively policed. Innovation was not a central competitive strategy 
because neither supply nor demand factors were as solid and pervasive as they are 
now. Investment levels in basic and applied research in the public and private sectors, 
in education were far lower than they are today. Innovation was not disparate and 
widely distributed, nor so comprehensively studied or serviced in terms of 
management, the law and finance. 
 
In contrast, in this day and age innovation is a central competitive strategy for firms. 
Innovation-thinking permeates industry in most sectors of economic activity. No 
business can afford not to innovate or at least adopt innovation as a significant 
competitive strategy, whether at the level of business practices or technology. This 
competitive imperative is absolutely critical to thinking about patents law – if 
innovating is overwhelmingly mandated by competitive market conditions then the 
justification for patents becomes less obvious. At the same time a solid educational 
and broader infrastructure further encourages and enables innovation in industry: 
apart from general education in science and technology, specialists study innovation 
and teach it in business and management schools around the industrialised world.10 
Modern technology is readily available, including R&D focussed instruments and 
machinery – in other words there is a dynamic specialist tooling sector that underpins 
innovation in industry.  
 
At the same time, flexible and innovative financial and management tools are 
constantly being refined to generate the required capital and management expertise to 
bring innovations to market. Various kinds of risk financing are possible and available, 
with sectorial specialisation. Underpinning that activity are the legal skills and tools 
required to bring innovation to fruition in a complex and multifarious market with 
diverse and dispersed actors.11 This infrastructure invites the pursuit of constant 
improvements, adaptations and developments, while the university and research 
sectors provide a matching supply of new information, knowledge and data that can 
be turned to account. The focus on ensuring diffusion by commercialisation of public 
sector innovations is now very strong.  
 
Today, innovation is not sporadic or occasional but continuous – not innovating 
automatically equals losing the competitive race. Innovating is not a choice but an 
inevitable necessity, an essential survival mechanism. 
 
The above account seeks to give prominence to the centrality of the innovation 
dynamic in post-industrial society both at the socio-cultural and economic level. This 
suggests that strong incentives to invent may already operate pervasively. Ascribing 
some merit to this account detracts from the potency of the incentive theory in patents 
law, that is, that patent monopolies, which come at a well documented cost,12 are 
required because incentives to invent are lacking. That may have been the case in the 
past, but it is at the very least more contestable in a modern society and economy with 
genuinely competitive markets. 
 
C. Problems with competition rather than incentives?  
 
If we assume no shortage of incentives to innovate in a post-industrial economic 
climate, what does this mean for patents? Part of the answer may lie in the early 
origins of the system: patents offered protection for the introduction and 
establishment of industries relying on technologies new to the realm (either by 
invention or from abroad). In a market whose competitiveness had been corroded by 
the irresponsible grant of monopolies in existing trades and industries, patents 
encouraged competition by new entry into local manufacturing13. A lack of 
competition was addressed by the grant of narrow monopolies (technology based, 
rather than product or industry based), encouraging new entrants to compete with 
incumbents. The grant in itself guaranteed no return to the grantee. 
 
Another pointer is the generally accepted fact, canvassed above, that certain product 
sectors such as pharma consider patents to be crucial. Yet as also contended above, at 
the same time medicine is an area of science and research where the incentive to 
innovate is strongest: the social impetus is compelling and public R&D investment 
correspondingly high; peer-based incentive structures operate acutely; and demand for 
new health solutions is close to insatiable. So arguably it is not a lack of incentives 
that necessitates patents here; it must be something else. The most obvious source is 
the presence in the pharma sector of the kind of conditions, discussed above14, which 
strongly deter new technological entrants, and for which a state granted technological 
monopoly may be an effective remedy. In contrast, competition failures in other 
product sectors may neither be amenable to ‘the gale of creative destruction’ nor 
responsive to the grant of a technological monopoly. Other competition enhancing 
regulatory measures (competition policy provisions) may be more appropriate. Yet as 
we know, patents apply without distinction to all technological products and processes, 
without express regard to the competition context – therein perhaps lies the rub. 
 
D. Patents as competition law 
 
All this points towards fashioning patents law into an instrument for addressing 
competition failures in industries with certain product and market characteristics, 
rather than regarding it as a mechanism to redress a shortfall in incentives to 
innovate.15 The preconditions of grant and scope of the exclusive right should be 
adapted to modify stagnant markets by the introduction of temporary technological 
monopolies. If viewed in this manner the whole patents system is integrated into the 
broader complex of competition law. The apparent contradiction between patent 
monopolies and competition policy/regulation dissolves and the two can operate 
seamlessly to address competition deficiencies across all markets by different 
remedial interventions (some of which will be technological monopolies but others 
not).16 
 
On a less ambitious scale, at the very least a competition focus suggests a 
conservative approach to patent extension. In the absence of the clearest evidence of 
competition failure in some identifiable product/process market, which a 
technological monopoly is actually adapted to redress, the boundaries of patentability 
should not be extended.18 Debates should go beyond the question of whether some 
new area involves technology, and centre on whether competition failure exists and is 
of a kind which can be efficiently addressed by grants of technological monopolies. 
Critiques of the patent system are now commonplace, and the approach above simply 
reinforces conclusions suggested by different angles of approach, which are largely 
based on concerns about proliferation and poor administration.  
 
E. Pervasive innovation, private ordering and mobility 
 
Because incentives to innovate pervade society their effect is dispersed: they operate 
on many and diverse actors, resulting in polycentric and disparate innovation. 
Multiple independent firms and organisations in private and public sectors initiate 
innovation. As a result information and knowledge is generated and held in disparate 
locations by different actors.18 Innovation is not centrally planned nor solely 
Government controlled. Information and knowledge is everywhere and not limited to 
specific reservoirs and channels. 
 
An acute need for efficient coordination and diffusion results from this polycentricity. 
Innovation while disparate remains highly interdependent. Dispersed actors need to 
learn and acquire previously or concurrently accumulated knowledge and data from 
each other. Knowledge and information has multiple possible uses which may be 
recognised and exploited by others rather than by the actual holder or creator. There 
must be a system of revealing and exchanging dispersed knowledge and information. 
Our system is complex and organically grown: it incorporates the public domain, 
embedded in a number of structures, and the proprietary domain in which 
communication and diffusion on the basis of the rules of intellectual property plays a 
significant role.19  
 
But non-proprietary legal mechanisms also impact significantly on how knowledge is 
revealed, dispersed and exchanged between diverse actors. Equity and contract 
regulate an individual’s access to and use of tacit, non-proprietary knowledge and 
know how.20 The contractual obligations entered into by autonomous parties, and 
equitable default principles are ‘relational’ rather than proprietary, and they impose 
standards on personal conduct. In terms of innovation, their impact is critical: the 
most effective information exchanges are personal. They come about by person to 
person contact, and most importantly by the mobility of knowledgeable individuals 
between firms and organisations. People take their knowledge with them to work in 
different environments, new firms and organisations with distinct complementarities, 
and direct and daily interaction with new colleagues. These interactions and 
exchanges are productive of ideas, insights and innovation. The critical legal 
instruments that underlie them, that is, employment contracts, and associated 
principles of equity21 are further examined next.  
 
 
III. Incentives for individuals to innovate 
 
A. Optimal conditions for individual creativity 
 
At the outset, this piece focussed on incentives for firms. I surmised that in today’s 
socio-cultural and economic environment such incentives are so pervasive, that there 
is no demonstrable need for an additional statutory incentive to create or invent. That 
contention then pointed to a reconceptualising of patents as instruments to address 
competition failures in certain markets or industries, such as pharmaceuticals, which 
might effectively be addressed by tailored technology-monopolies. 
 
But incentives to create must also be considered at the level of the individual rather 
than the firm. Not only do individuals in a mobile society act as critical diffusers of 
knowledge as argued in Part I, they are also the source of all invention. The creative 
genius ‘myth’ may rightly have been debunked in IP law, but there is no escaping the 
fact that new knowledge cannot be generated without the creative faculties, the mental 
processes of individuals. Nothing new in the practical arts comes about without the 
human mind. It is this insight that leads us to focus on the incentives that apply to 
individuals to create, to reveal, to communicate. However, in the modern environment 
individuals can rarely operate independently: they are dependent on firms and 
organisations which can accumulate and organise the complex and multifarious 
complementary resources that permit creative activity. The firm is the common 
environment for critical inter-personal exchanges. Most often, individuals are legally 
embedded in firms or other organisations by contractual employment relationships. 
Therefore the firm based employment context is the primary focus of attention here. 
 
Two interesting questions arise in this context: first, how to optimise incentives for 
individuals to invent, create, innovate in the firm environment; and second, how to 
optimise the conditions for the realisation of individuals’ creative ideas and 
inventions. Innovation policy and management literature tends to focus on the first 
question: how to structure material incentives for employees most efficiently. In terms 
of patents this becomes a debate concerning ownership; rights to exploit a patented 
invention as between employer and employee; royalty rights; patenting premiums and 
the like, and also about the primacy of contract or the need for statutory intervention 
in this area.  
 
But even though the incentive to innovate is universal, the micro-conditions for 
realisation of innovations are variable, which demands attention for the second issue: 
what are the optimal conditions for the realisation of the creative insights of an 
individual employee? Individual incentives should operate to encourage the revelation 
of creative ideas where the chances of realisation are the greatest.22 But what are the 
optimal conditions for revelation and realisation of new ideas? How do we generate or 
organise such conditions? These are exceedingly difficult and complex questions to 
attempt to answer in theory and a priori. Instead, I suggest a simpler starting point – 
that creative individuals themselves are best able to identify and evaluate conditions 
that stimulate their own creativity.23 And therefore knowledgeable individuals should 
be free to exercise employment choices between firms and organisations that offer 
different conditions for creative activity. 
 
Presuming that alternatives do exist, a number of conditions must be fulfilled for 
individuals to be able to make and realise such choices. First, they must have access 
to information concerning the resources of, and conditions within relevant firms;24 and 
second labour market conditions and the law must leave them at liberty to put their 
choices into effect by migrating between firms and organisations, whether on a 
concurrent or consecutive basis. If there is sufficient freedom to migrate between 
organisations individuals will be more likely to find the conditions that optimise 
opportunities for realisation. 
 
B. Relevant legal mechanisms 
 
In terms of the relevant legal mechanisms, because most creative individuals are 
employees we are substantially within the province of labour law.25 The latter takes us 
too far away from the present IPR context, but there is a close connection between 
labour law and aspects of intellectual property law relevant to mobility. These aspects 
are employee entitlement to statutory IPRs; and trade secrets and contracts law.  
 
The predominant focus below is on the latter: legal restraints on individuals’ ability to 
draw on previously acquired know-how will act as a disincentive to move, and also 
restrain an individual’s creativity in a new environment. Mobility cannot have 
positive effects on creativity if individuals are not free to draw on knowledge they 
have previously gained. Some comments concerning employee entitlements to 
statutory IPR’s are nonetheless appropriate here. If we favour the mobility of 
employees in full possession of their knowledge, experience, ideas and know-how –
their creative tools – then there are two broad preferences: one favouring employee 
IPR ownership, or at least participation; and another favouring dealing with 
inventions retrospectively and individually rather than prospectively and universally. 
In other words, the rights of ownership and exploitation should be dealt with at the 
time the employee makes the invention.26 This policy approach may appear 
counterintuitive to firm managers, who might incline towards the broadest possible a 
priori claims over employee-IP, but experience shows that commercial outcomes are 
not necessarily less favourable for firms that are more prepared to negotiate with 
creative employees.27 
 
However, if the crucial question is to what extent individuals are able to migrate with 
all their knowledge, conversely what rights an ex-employer can exercise over such 
knowledge, then property rights or ownership of inventions only provide part of the 
answer. With a view to mobility between firms (employers), equity and contract are 
as significant as patent ownership, if not more so. The freedom to use all knowledge 
held in the mind, all learning, insight, know-how and skills absorbed with a previous 
employer, without restraint, in new and different conditions which an individual 
considers more conducive to invention and creativity, is critical. Legally this freedom 
depends on how rules and principles deal with knowledge that is either not subject to 
property rights, or over which no property claims have been staked. Often this is 
compendiously and loosely referred to as tacit knowledge, or legally as know-how. 
The contract of employment may seek to resolve contested claims to such knowledge, 
but equity and the law concerning restraints of trade impose marked limitations on 
contractual terms in this regard.  
 
In the absence of express contractual clauses, the equitable obligation of confidence 
imposes restrictions on the use of particular identifiable trade secrets post-termination. 
Other than in relation to those, the employee is generally absolutely free to use and 
deploy everything she has previously learned, whether or not she is now in direct 
competition with the ex-employer. However, the scope of the rights that employers 
enjoy over trade secrets under the mantle of the equitable obligation of confidence is 
both narrow and unpredictable. Narrow, because it extends no further than what can 
be properly particularised, demonstrated to be outside the public domain and 
communicated in circumstances of confidence. Unpredictable, because the dividing 
line between what is a trade secret and what is general know-how and experience 
lying outside the confines of trade secret protection is often very difficult to draw.28 
What is more, there are various policy imperatives (freedom of competition, tools of 
trade theory and the like), and consequent principles underlying the law in this area, 
which do not generally favour the employer in a particular case. 
 
An employer’s ordinary reaction to this is to shore up its position by seeking to insert 
favourable terms into the contract of employment. These tend to take two forms, 
although there is considerable legal ingenuity in this area. The first is expansive 
confidentiality clauses; the second is covenants in restraint of trade. The latter are a 
well recognised weapon in the employer’s armoury, but are subject to very severe 
restraints in scope and enforceability. The general policy of the law is to hold such 
covenants unenforceable.29 However, in exception to that rule, reasonable restraints 
will be enforced by the courts if they are demonstrably justified to protect 
particularised employer trade secrets. This means that the employer must be in a 
position to establish, if the covenant is challenged in court, that it has such trade 
secrets in its possession, exactly what they concern, and that the ex-employee had 
access to them (or generated them in the pursuit of her duties). Furthermore, it must 
establish that the prohibition on working in a certain area and industry for a certain 
time is reasonably adapted to protecting the employer’s legitimate interests in its own 
trade secrets. The difficulty lies in predicting what a court will hold reasonable in the 
particular circumstances of a given case.30 
 
In terms of express confidentiality clauses, the employer might be tempted to insert 
terms that include as much information as possible under the umbrella of contractual 
trade secrets protection. However, the courts have held that contracts cannot make 
trade secrets out of information that is in the public domain; and they equally demand 
particularisation. Abstract ‘umbrella’ terms that purport to cover otherwise 
unidentified items of information will often not be particular enough to enforce. But 
the alternative of identifying particular trade secrets in substance is of course difficult 
to do in an employment contract. It operates prospectively, intending to apply to as 
yet unidentified information that will emerge at some later date, either by way of the 
employee herself or in some other manner within the organisation. It may be possible 
to identify existing trade secrets at the time of entering into the employment contract, 
but usually it is too onerous to do so comprehensively. But it will be far more difficult, 
if not impossible to do in relation to future or anticipated trade secrets. So the 
employer may have little alternative but to refer to abstract categories (‘the trade 
secrets’, the ‘confidential information’ and so on) in the contract. However, when 
seeking to enforce such terms, he will be in no better position than when, in the 
absence of express provisions in the contract, relying on equity alone: having to 
establish what is a genuine trade secret, as opposed to general know-how the 
employee is entitled to use. And then the law has a further difficulty where an 
employee’s ideas are inchoate: courts tend to limit the grant of equitable remedies 
where an idea is not fully worked out, its practical use not fully described and its 
commercial value uncertain. 
 
Thus the law may superficially appear to favour the employer but in its particular 
application in fact tend to support an employee’s right to leave and escape the ex-
employer’s control over all her acquired knowledge, other than in relation to a narrow 
and difficult to prove category of genuine trade secrets.31 This favours employee 
mobility, and means that knowledgeable and creative individuals have a large and 
unrestrained measure of freedom to determine where to work – in other words, to 
decide where their chances of creative output, realisation and/or dissemination are 
optimal. If we accept, as suggested above, that individuals are the most capable of 
assessing optimal conditions for creative work and realisation, then this is positive. 
Rather than attempt to identify ideal conditions for creative work theoretically and a 
priori, we can presume that those firms with the most conducive conditions will be 
most effective in attracting creative individuals, and will thus be most likely to 
survive and prosper. 
 
However, two worrying trends invite some comment. The first is a tendency in some 
quarters to elevate notions of contractual autonomy, in particular in relation to 
knowledgeable (that is, well-educated) employees, above notions of public policy that 
require active policing of restraints of trade.32 The second is the fact that there is a 
dichotomy between the perception and the reality of legal rights in relation to 
restraints and broad confidentiality clauses. Although there may be severe doubts 
about enforceability of certain clauses and restraints, it may be that most employees 
are unwilling to challenge them in court, given the risks involved in doing so. 
Restraints that are unreasonable in terms of the law may in fact be observed in 
practice. Arguably this would be detrimental in terms of the policy settings discussed 
above. 
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
I have highlighted the importance of thinking differently about incentives and 
innovation in two ways. First, at the level of the firm, I have argued that the focus 
should not be on incentives to innovate, because such incentives arguably pervade 
post-industrial societies.33 Rather the focus should be on patents as a legal device to 
enhance competition in markets that are not dynamic due to various factors, where 
there is reason to suppose that the problem can be effectively addressed by 
technological monopolies.  
 
Additionally, I have argued that thinking about incentives must also focus on 
individuals. This requires thinking about which incentives will induce individuals to 
be inventive, but also about the ideal conditions for generating and realising creative 
output from individuals. Identifying those conditions theoretically or empirically is 
arguably too complex; a reasonable alternative is to accept individuals as rational 
maximisers of their own inventive or creative capacity. They are the best placed to 
make the ex post facto choice between existing firms and organisations as to which 
will maximise their chances of creative output. From that perspective it is beneficial 
to ensure, in terms of legal policy, that individuals have sufficient access to 
information to identify the firms with the most potential, and that they enjoy 
conditions of mobility with all their knowledge and know-how, so they can act on 
their preferences and transfer between organisations with a view to maximising their 
inventive output. This will encourage the realisation and diffusion, whether by 
commercialisation or otherwise, of their creative ideas. 
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